practical intellect is the source of human actions. This power issues human action with the help of theoretical reason and by forging special rules and credentials related to action such as obligation. According to Allameh Tabatabai, the validity of obligation is the first and most important rule of practical reason in order to issue a definite verb. Credit obligation in relation to some verbs may be absolute and in relation to other verbs. The more this application is, the less disturbing the issuance of the verb will be, but the obligatory obligation will cause the verb to be issued only in certain circumstances. The problem of doubt in practical rationality is explained by the application and restriction on the necessity of the action. Higher application in obligation means more intensity and more restraint means less intensity in issuing the verb. The root of this application and restriction also goes back to the attention of the soul. This application and restriction may be formed around the actions of each of the forces that play a role in the issuance of the verb, the most important of which are Theoretical intellect ,illusion, anger and lust, because the practical intellect in the necessity and issuance of any verb is influenced by one of these forces. The passivity of the practical intellect against the lower powers causes the necessity of a gentle action to be issued with that power with more application and less restraint (less disturbance). The lowest degree of rationality is rationality bound by lust, and practical rationality focused on anger, delusion, and theoretical reason are ranked higher, respectively.

The aim of this research is to infer the foundations of social justice based on practical rationality from the perspective of Allameh Tabatabaei. This qualitative study utilizes the practical inference method of Frankena to elucidate the topic. To achieve this goal, the concepts related to practical rationality in the works of Allameh Tabatabaei are examined, and the foundations of social justice are inferred in two categories: pre-social foundations and post-social foundations. The pre-social foundations include the employment of knowledgeable individuals based on the governing laws and the fair service and interaction with peers, the credibility of social justice based on rational sciences in the course of sound nature, religious justice by instilling faith in rights and practical obligations, and individual justice through acquiring virtuous ethics through scientific indoctrination and practical repetition. The post-social foundations encompass social justice by placing each member of society in an appropriate position and ensuring equal rights, political justice in terms of the participation of members in establishing the government, appointing officials, and legislating within the framework of divine regulations, ownership through legitimate human possession of their properties, economic justice through growth and development of accessible wealth in accordance with Islamic principles and collective interests, and social rights by forming families for the preservation of future generations.

This study, done with a descriptive-analytical method aiming at explaining the theoretical and practical rationality in rational orientations of the curriculum as well as investigating the relationship between them and the attitude towards theoretical and practical intellect in Islamic philosophy, is based on the hypothesis that rationality as one of the orientations of the curriculum is originated from the various foundations especially the philosophical foundations. The findings of the study show that rational orientations of the curriculum are based on one of the two rationalities, i. e. theoretical rationality or practical rationality; this is while academic rationalism put forward by Eisner and Vallance, Schubert’ s rational traditionalism, and Taylor’ s instrumental rationality are mostly rooted in theoretical rationality; and Schwab’ s deliberative action, by distancing from theoretical rationality, applies practical rationality in special situations. According to the views of many Islamic philosophers, despite the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, they are interrelated. practical intellect, assisted and backed by theoretical intellect, deals with minor affairs and infers industries and actions from it. As a result, lesson planners are faced with predetermined rational beliefs, general opinions, decisions and goals. Besides, they choose, along with general beliefs, various methods and means in certain situations, and even make changes in intermediate and minor goals.

As the foundation of management, rationality can provide distinctive features for schools of management. At present, in spite of attention to religious rationality in the current researches, the rationality of Jihadi management has not been specifically addressed. This research is aimed at understanding the rationality of Jihadi management by investigating related verses to Jihad in the following commentaries of the Holy Qur’ an: “ Almizan” , “ Nemoneh” , “ Majmaulbayan” , and “ Tasnim” . Speeches of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution concerning Jihadi management as well as the views of the scholars have also been studied. This research follows a comparative qualitative content analysis. Accordingly, in the first stage, three types of rationalities, that is, theoretical, practical and performance, were selected as the comprehensive categories. An analysis of the various documents and interviews resulted in the identification of the subcategories. The study resulted in 791 codes, which were categorized into 75 sub-themes, 12 main themes and three types of wisdom, which were included in the final model of the research. The results indicated that theoretical rationality includes belief in the struggle between right and wrong and special compassion from God: practical rationality includes religious components, attention to supernatural power, and fighting against the enemies; finally, performance rationality includes the components of wisdom, sacrifice, the constructive relationship between the leader and the followers, the problem-orientation, systematicity, the proper encounter with the enemy, and endeavor.

Bernard Williams in his “Internal and External Reasons” argues for internalism about reasons. He holds that according to internalism of reasons, agent A has reason to Φ if and only if he has a desire ψ which will be satisfied by Φ-ing and he also believes that it is so. Williams maintains that if one does not have a preceding desire and cannot form any desires through deliberation then it will be rational to claim that he does not have reason to Φ. Clearly desires play a crucial role here because if an agent does not have such desires, then he does not have reasons for action. Williams goes beyond this claim and says only internal reasons are reasons for action. In this article, we argue against his claim. After explaining descriptive and normative senses of rationality and alternative views regarding the rationality of beliefs and desires, in virtue of the idea of blameworthiness, responsibility, and having practical reason, we show that there are a set of actions for which moral agents are blameworthy and they, therefore, have reasons at least for certain actions which are not dependent upon their desires. This idea would be supported by the facts that most people consider a person who violates hedonic, prudential, and moral norms as much as possible to be irrational, that they consider the act of counting him as rational to be counterintuitive, and finally that societies have founded institutions for restraining such a person.Our argument from blameworthiness can be formulated as follows:(1) If a moral agent performs an action X for which he can justly be blamed, then he will be responsible and he ought not to perform X (the concept of blameworthiness entails responsibility).(2) If a moral agent is responsible and he ought not to perform X, then there is a reason for him not to perform X (responsibility entails having reason).(3) There are a set of actions, S, that moral agents can be justly blamed for performing.(4) So moral agents are responsible for performing an action in S (from 1 and 3).(5) So there are reasons for moral agents not to perform an action in S (from 2 and 4).By falsifying the negation of premise (3), we show that (3) is true. To falsify that it is not the case that there are actions for which moral agents can be justly blamed, we presented an example of an extremely immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking agent who forms abnormal desires and acts against moral, prudent, and hedonic norms as much as possible. Since there are not any desires for such norms in his psychology, and his actions are based on these desires, he is not regarded as rational by most people and social institutions such as psychiatric clinics and courts. In addition, it would be irrational to hold that he is rational in his having immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking desires and acting accordingly because it is a rational, prevalent, conventional practice to believe so and any theory which denies its rationality should provide convincing reasons.

Introduction: From a long time ago, benefiting from technology has been an inevitable thing for human interests, which is born and based on science. It can be claimed that there is harmony between ethics, science and technology, which promote each other. In this article, the researcher discusses this harmony and compatibility. Material and Methods: The current review study was descriptive and using the study of sources and research keywords among the books and articles published in the databases of Thomson Information Institute, Science Direct and Pub Med. Conclusion: As science and technology continue to advance and become more integrated into our daily lives, ethical considerations become increasingly important. For example, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has raised questions about the potential implications of creating machines that can make autonomous decisions and take actions. If science and technology were considered as a tool, it should have been able to subjugate humans and influence all aspects of behavior and values. While it has become a problem that eventually becomes aligned with morality by applying reason, and people now seek help from it as a tool.

In this article, after reviewing the difference between fundamentalist and anti-fundamentalist philosophy, the features of the rationality will be explained from the perspective of five anti-fundamentalist philosophers (Habermas, Richard Rorty, MacIntyre, Michel Foucault and Hayek). The common point stated by all these philosophers is that they all criticize metaphysics and doubt about the basis of fundamentalist narrative on the world that rely on two predicates: first, the world has rational constitution and it is possible to reduce it to precise mathematical relations and second, that basis of the world is reflected totally in the mind of human beings.

rationality as logical consistency is, formally, directly related to logical derivations. The idea behind reductio ad absurdum is captured in this relation.

rationality of Faith is one of the most important issues in contemporary philosophy of Religion that most philosophers of religion have discussed it. Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne with theistic approach have discussed this subject. Swinburne with evidentialist approach concludes that religious belief like every another belief can be rational only if it has evidence and of cource theists have evidence for their belives so they are justified and rational. But Plantinga criticizes evidentialism and classical foundationalism. Instead of justification, He uses concept of Warrant and finally concludes that Christian believes have proper warrant so Christians are rational in their believes.In this project I want to survey and compare this two great thinkers ’views. My questions in this project are: 1) what criticisms Plantinga can has to Swinburne approach? 2) Is not Plantinga’s analogy argument a Kind of evidentialism? 3) Way does Plantinga use concept of Warrant instead of Justification? 4) What is difference between Warrant and Justification? 5) Are Christian believes properly warranted?

The rationality of ethics is one of the most important issues for philosophers. This concept includes judgment on rationality of choice and justification of beliefs as well as explanation and justification of moral behaviors.Strong, weak and moderate rationalists take different positions, based on their approaches to the concept of reason. Having more inclination to the role of emotions, weak rationalists do not agree with the others in epistemic and motivational role of reason. Despite many similarities, strong and moderate rationalists think differently about the role of cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of moral motivation.In this paper, we clarify the relationship between morality and reason in these three approaches. Justification of behaviors and moral motivation, as well as intemalism and extemalism are discussed in this paper. At last, the role virtue as a mean of justifying the moral rationality is emphasized.